Federal Supremacy in Immigration:

Why Colorado's Lawsuit Against Deputy Zwinck Must Fail

In the rugged landscapes of western Colorado, a routine traffic stop has ignited a firestorm over the boundaries of state and federal authority. On June 5, 2025, Mesa County Sheriff's Deputy Alexander Zwinck pulled over 19-year-old Caroline Dias Goncalves, a Brazilian national and Utah nursing student, for following too closely on Interstate 70. He issued a warning and let her go. Yet, shortly after, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents arrested her due to an expired visa. It later emerged that Deputy Zwinck had shared her information in a Signal group chat with local, state, and federal law enforcement partners, including representatives from Homeland Security Investigations and ICE. This act of interagency communication, far from being a rogue move, aligns with longstanding federal priorities in immigration enforcement. However, Colorado Attorney General Phil Weiser has filed a lawsuit against the deputy, alleging violations of state laws that prohibit such sharing. This action not only scapegoats a dedicated officer but also clashes head-on with federal supremacy under the U.S. Constitution's Supremacy Clause. Colorado's restrictive statutes, including Senate Bill 21-131 and House Bill 23-1100, are preempted by federal law, as established by key precedents like Arizona v. United States and the foundational protections in 8 U.S.C. § 1373. The lawsuit should be dismissed to uphold national unity in immigration policy and protect officers like Deputy Zwinck from undue state interference.

The Incident and Its Immediate Aftermath

The facts of the case reveal a troubling overreach by state officials. After the traffic stop, Dias Goncalves' arrest by ICE sparked community backlash and an internal investigation by the Mesa County Sheriff's Office. On July 30, 2025, Sheriff Todd Rowell released findings confirming that Deputy Zwinck's sharing of information facilitated the federal arrest. Rowell acknowledged potential violations of Colorado state law but took responsibility, emphasizing the office's practices limiting involvement in immigration enforcement. Deputy Zwinck faced three weeks of unpaid leave, removal from a task force, and reassignment to patrol duties. A second deputy in the chat received two weeks of unpaid leave, and their sergeant was suspended for two days. These internal measures pale against the civil lawsuit's threat: a $50,000 fine for merely relaying information to federal partners. Sheriff Rowell rightly criticized Weiser for selective enforcement, urging equal application to all officials in the chat and others violating the state bills. He highlighted perceived hypocrisy, noting that the attorney general should file suits and hold press conferences for every similar infraction. Rowell also requested that Weiser dismiss the lawsuit to allow internal discipline and training to proceed.

Dias Goncalves, who had no criminal history, was detained for 15 days following the arrest. The incident underscores the human element, yet it also highlights the practical realities of law enforcement collaboration in a border state like Colorado.

Colorado's Restrictive Immigration Laws

At the heart of this dispute are Colorado's laws designed to curb local cooperation with federal immigration authorities. Senate Bill 21-131, enacted in 2021, imposes strict limitations on the sharing of personal identifying information collected by state agencies, including details related to immigration status. It mandates safeguards against disclosure to federal entities unless explicitly required by law, aiming to protect vulnerable populations but effectively creating barriers to routine law enforcement collaboration. House Bill 23-1100, passed in 2023, builds on this by reinforcing prohibitions on state and local employees participating in federal immigration enforcement operations. Together, these laws form Article 74, which prohibits sharing certain information with federal agents for immigration enforcement purposes, with narrow exceptions for active criminal investigations. Proponents frame these as shields against overreach, but critics, including Kristi Burton Brown of Advance Colorado, argue they dangerously ban proactive notifications to the Department of Homeland Security about violent criminals or repeat felons present illegally, with hefty fines for noncompliance.

These measures reflect a broader trend in sanctuary policies, but they come at a cost. By fining officers for incidental sharing during multi-agency communications, Colorado risks chilling essential partnerships that combat crimes like drug smuggling and human trafficking.

The Supremacy Clause and Federal Preemption

These state measures, while well-intentioned in some eyes, directly conflict with federal law and the Constitution's mandate that federal authority prevails in immigration matters. The Supremacy Clause in Article VI declares that federal law is "the supreme Law of the Land," binding on all states. Immigration enforcement falls squarely within federal domain, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed. In Arizona v. United States (2012), the Court struck down key provisions of Arizona's S.B. 1070, holding that federal law preempts state attempts to regulate immigration in ways that conflict with or encroach upon national policy. Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the majority, emphasized the federal government's "broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens," rooted in the Constitution's Naturalization Clause and inherent sovereign authority over foreign relations. The Court outlined preemption doctrines: express preemption where Congress explicitly bars state action; field preemption where federal regulation is so pervasive that states have no room to supplement; and conflict preemption where state law obstructs federal objectives.

Colorado's laws create precisely such obstacles, fragmenting the unified system and inviting preemption challenges. They interfere with the federal government's constitutional discretion over immigration, causing confusion among law enforcement and compromising investigations.

Key Legal Precedents Supporting Federal Authority

Applying these doctrines, the Court in Arizona invalidated sections criminalizing failure to carry alien registration documents (field preemption, as Congress occupied the registration field per Hines v. Davidowitz, 1941), prohibiting unauthorized work (conflict preemption, as it undermined Congress's deliberate choice not to penalize aliens seeking employment), and allowing warrantless arrests for removability (conflict preemption, exceeding federal limits on state authority). While upholding a provision requiring status checks during stops, the decision underscored that states cannot create obstacles to federal enforcement. Kennedy warned, "Federal law makes a single sovereign responsible for maintaining a comprehensive and unified system to keep track of aliens within the Nation's borders."

More recently, in United States v. California (921 F.3d 865, 9th Cir. 2019), the Ninth Circuit addressed similar sanctuary laws, including California's SB 54, which limited information sharing with ICE. The federal government argued preemption under §1373, but the court upheld most provisions, finding no direct conflict because SB 54 permitted sharing of basic immigration status while restricting other data like release dates. However, it struck down parts of another law (AB 450) that barred voluntary consent to workplace raids, deeming them obstacles to federal enforcement. This reasoning bolsters Deputy Zwinck's defense; Colorado's broader bans on sharing personal information, which encompass immigration details, go beyond California's and directly obstruct federal objectives.

The Role of 8 U.S.C. § 1373

Central to this preemption argument is 8 U.S.C. § 1373, a federal statute explicitly prohibiting restrictions on information sharing about immigration status. Enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, §1373 states: "Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, a Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual." It further bars prohibitions on maintaining, exchanging, or responding to inquiries about such information. This law ensures seamless communication between levels of government, vital for effective immigration enforcement without commandeering state resources.

Courts have upheld §1373's validity and its preemptive force against state sanctuary policies. In City of New York v. United States (179 F.3d 29, 2d Cir. 1999), the Second Circuit rejected New York's challenge to §1373 under the Tenth Amendment, ruling that it does not commandeer state officials but merely removes barriers to voluntary cooperation. The court noted, "The City's executive order does not regulate the Federal Government's activities; nor does it impose any requirements upon the Federal Government. Instead, the order governs the activities of City employees." By prohibiting restrictions, §1373 preserves federal supremacy without forcing action, aligning with anti-commandeering precedents like Printz v. United States (1997), which barred federal mandates on state officers but allowed voluntary participation. Critically, the Ninth Circuit affirmed §1373's constitutionality post-Murphy v. NCAA (2018), which invalidated a federal ban on state sports betting as commandeering. The Ninth Circuit distinguished §1373: "It does not require states or localities to enact particular legislation or to assist in enforcing federal law... It simply requires that nothing obstruct the communication that does occur."

Recent Developments and Ongoing Challenges

Ongoing challenges to Colorado's laws underscore this preemption. On August 8, 2025, Mesa County filed a lawsuit in federal court against Governor Jared Polis and Attorney General Phil Weiser, arguing that Article 74 is unconstitutionally vague and interferes with federal immigration authority. The suit, which includes Sheriff Rowell as a plaintiff, seeks clarification that violations occur only if information is shared for the "sole" purpose of immigration enforcement and that local officers can inquire about status for legitimate purposes. Mesa County Attorney Todd Starr emphasized, "The statute’s lack of clarity creates a significant risk... of arbitrary enforcement, which could lead to substantial fines and legal challenges against our employees. This action sends a clear message: We will not stand by while our employees are targeted for doing their jobs." Commissioners voted to file the countersuit to protect employees' constitutional rights and counter what they call "political theater" by Weiser.

This follows Weiser's July 22, 2025, lawsuit against Zwinck. Similar suits by counties like Douglas highlight broader discontent, emphasizing dangers to public safety. These cases echo critiques: Sanctuary policies can shield criminals and undermine trust.

Policy Implications and Public Safety Concerns

Beyond legal precedent, policy imperatives demand federal supremacy. Immigration involves national security, foreign policy, and uniform standards; fragmented state approaches lead to chaos. Deputy Zwinck's actions promoted safety by alerting federal partners to an immigration violation discovered incidentally. Punishing him discourages cooperation, potentially allowing threats to persist. Sheriff Rowell's call for equal enforcement highlights the lawsuit's selectivity, targeting a deputy while ignoring others in the chat, including Colorado State Patrol. This smacks of political theater, eroding morale among officers sworn to protect all residents.

Critics may argue states have Tenth Amendment rights to allocate resources, as in Printz, where the Supreme Court barred federal gun check mandates on sheriffs. Yet, Deputy Zwinck's sharing was voluntary, not mandated; Colorado's fines punish choice, inverting anti-commandeering by commandeering non-cooperation. Federal law encourages such collaboration through programs like 287(g), where locals assist ICE under federal oversight. Precedents like Arizona affirm that states cannot "curtail or complement" federal schemes. In Kansas v. Garcia (2020), the Supreme Court refused to preempt state identity theft prosecutions using federal forms, but reinforced that immigration's core remains federal.

The stakes extend beyond one deputy. If Colorado prevails, it sets a precedent for states to balkanize immigration enforcement, weakening borders and inviting abuse. Communities suffer when local police fear fines for basic communication, deterring reporting of serious crimes. Advance Colorado's push to reverse "radical policies" resonates: Safety demands unity, not division. The vagueness of Article 74 chills interactions with federal agencies, compromising investigations into drug smuggling, child exploitation, and sex crimes.

Conclusion

Federal supremacy, enshrined in the Supremacy Clause and bolstered by precedents like Arizona v. United States and §1373's clear directives, must override Colorado's restrictive laws. Deputy Zwinck's rights to cooperate without fear of state reprisal deserve protection. Attorney General Weiser should drop this misguided suit, heed Sheriff Rowell's plea for equity, and let federal authority guide immigration. Only then can we ensure a secure, cohesive nation where law enforcement serves without undue shackles. The alternative, a patchwork of state defiance, threatens the very fabric of our union.

Michael J Badagliacco, “MJB”

Michael is a United States Air Force Veteran, father of five and grandfather of three, passionate about this country and the Constitution. 

Editor-in-Chief, Colorado DOGE Report.