Asking the right Question

by Michael J Badagliacco, "MJB"

In an Op-Ed penned by Mr. Stockton on Monday June 8, 2026 in the Montrose Mirror, Stockton asked the wrong question of Google’s AI, the question relied on an incomplete and selective summary as authoritative, and overlooked key federal statutes and case law that directly address municipal authority and obligations regarding immigration enforcement.

His op-ed correctly notes there is no federal statute mandating that any city “declare itself” non-sanctuary. That narrow point is true but irrelevant to the actual policy debate. The operative questions are whether a municipality may adopt a non-sanctuary policy? They can! And whether broad sanctuary-style restrictions on cooperation are consistent with federal law? They are not!

I am not an attorney and do not claim to be one. However, I have studied the relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and precedents extensively through primary sources and sustained research that goes well beyond a single AI query framed to produce a desired answer. One need not hold a bar card to read statutes, trace their application in reported decisions, or reason logically from text, history, and structure. Attorneys themselves frequently disagree, cite incorrectly, or lose on the precise authority they invoke; that is why we have courts rather than treating any lawyer’s opinion as gospel. Stockton’s piece illustrates the hazard of treating a decontextualized AI output as dispositive while ignoring the actual statutory and doctrinal framework.

What the Op-Ed Gets Wrong

1. It ignores 8 U.S.C. § 1373, the federal statute that directly limits sanctuary-style policies. This 1996 law provides, in relevant part:

Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, a Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service [now DHS/ICE] information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.

Subsection (b) reinforces that no person or agency may prohibit or restrict the sending, requesting, receiving, maintaining, or exchanging of such information. The statute expressly overrides conflicting local policies. It does not commandeer local resources to perform federal enforcement work; it simply prevents localities from erecting barriers to voluntary information-sharing on immigration status.

The Second Circuit upheld § 1373 against an anti-commandeering challenge in City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999), precisely because the statute preserves voluntary cooperation rather than forcing affirmative enforcement. Many sanctuary ordinances are drafted with carve-outs purporting to comply with § 1373, but policies that functionally prohibit or chill status-related communication with ICE fall within its prohibition. Stockton’s AI answer never mentioned this statute because he asked only whether federal law requires a non-sanctuary designation.

2. It conflates civil immigration violations with federal criminal offenses and misstates local law enforcement obligations. Unlawful presence is generally a civil matter subject to removal proceedings. Immigration detainers issued by ICE for civil purposes are requests, not warrants or commands. The anti-commandeering doctrine (rooted in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)) prevents the federal government from forcing state or local officers to administer federal regulatory programs or expend their own resources to enforce them. Courts have applied this to civil detainers.

However, 8 U.S.C. § 1325 makes improper entry a federal criminal offense. A first offense is punishable by fine or imprisonment for not more than six months; subsequent or aggravated violations carry higher penalties, up to a felony. Illegal re-entry after removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 is a felony with penalties up to two years or more.

Local law enforcement officers have authority to arrest for violations of federal criminal immigration statutes. Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1983), held that the structure of the Immigration and Nationality Act does not preclude local enforcement of its criminal provisions. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(c) expressly authorizes state and local officers “whose duty it is to enforce criminal laws” to make arrests for harboring, shielding, or transporting violations. When a federal judicial arrest warrant exists for a criminal immigration violation such as § 1325 or § 1326, local officers may lawfully execute or facilitate the arrest and transfer the individual to federal custody. Policies that categorically prohibit honoring valid criminal warrants or assisting in such cases raise serious Supremacy Clause concerns and conflict with ordinary law-enforcement practice.

Stockton’s blanket assertion that localities are “not obligated by law to assist federal law enforcement in capturing and retaining those that are here illegally” is therefore incorrect as a categorical statement. It erases the criminal/civil distinction and the authority (and practical expectation) that attaches to judicial warrants for federal crimes.

3. It misapplies the anti-commandeering doctrine to voluntary cooperation and declarations of policy. Anti-commandeering bars federal compulsion of state legislative or executive action to enforce federal programs. It does not prohibit localities from choosing to cooperate with federal authorities, sharing information protected by § 1373, honoring criminal warrants, or adopting policies that affirm such cooperation. A non-sanctuary declaration is simply a statement of intent to operate within the bounds of federal law, to share status information where not prohibited, and to assist with criminal enforcement when warrants or lawful requests arise. That choice is constitutionally available and has been exercised by numerous jurisdictions. Voluntary cooperation, including through 287(g) agreements, has long been upheld.

4. Reliance on a single Google AI output framed around the wrong question is not rigorous legal analysis. AI summaries can be useful starting points but are not substitutes for reading the statute, its legislative history, and the cases that interpret it. Stockton’s query (“Are there federal laws requiring municipalities to declare themselves non-sanctuary?”) guaranteed the answer he received. The pertinent inquiry, “May a municipality lawfully adopt a non-sanctuary policy, and what federal statutes constrain sanctuary restrictions?” leads directly to § 1373, the criminal provisions of §§ 1325/1326, and the limits of anti-commandeering as applied to civil detainers versus criminal warrants. Treating one AI paragraph as authoritative while ignoring these authorities is precisely the selective approach he criticizes in others.

Bottom Line

Dave Stockton is correct on one narrow point: federal law does not force Montrose (or any city) to issue a non-sanctuary declaration. He is incorrect, however, in suggesting there is “no law” relevant to the question or that localities have blanket license to adopt policies that restrict information-sharing with ICE or refuse to assist with federal criminal enforcement when judicial warrants are presented. 8 U.S.C. § 1373, the criminal immigration statutes, the Supremacy Clause, and the distinction between compelled civil enforcement and authorized cooperation on criminal matters supply the missing legal framework.

A non-sanctuary designation is a lawful, policy-level affirmation that the city will not obstruct federal immigration enforcement, will comply with federal information-sharing requirements, and will assist with criminal matters in accordance with existing authority. That position rests on statutes and precedents, not mere opinion. Citizens and public officials are entitled to examine those authorities directly rather than accept a decontextualized AI answer to a misdirected question as the final word.