Constitutional Rights Reserved for Citizens:

A Historical Imperative

In the recent Sixth Circuit decision United States v. Escobar-Temal (Dec. 15, 2025), Judge Amul Thapar's partial dissent powerfully argues that "the people" in the Constitution refers exclusively to U.S. citizens. This premise aligns with the document's foundational purpose as a charter for self-governing citizens, not noncitizens. Extending rights to unlawful immigrants, as the majority suggests, contradicts text, history, and tradition. This article examines Thapar's view, supported by constitutional and historical sources, to affirm that rights are inherently for citizens.

Case Context

Milder Escobar-Temal, a Guatemalan citizen unlawfully in the U.S. since 2012, was convicted under 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(5)(A) for possessing firearms. The majority upheld the ban but held that some undocumented individuals with "substantial connections" like residency and family could claim Second Amendment rights. Thapar concurred in the judgment upholding the conviction but dissented on the scope of "the people," insisting it means consenting citizens. He roots this in popular sovereignty: "We, the People" denotes citizens who legitimize government through consent.

Textual Foundations

The Constitution's text distinguishes "the people," "citizens," and "persons." Thapar notes "the people" appears in rights-bearing contexts like the First, Second, and Fourth Amendments, implying citizens' political community. For instance, the Preamble's "We, the People" establishes sovereignty for citizens, not aliens. James Madison in Federalist No. 49 described "the people" as the "fountain of all authority," excluding non-consenters.

Historical sources reinforce this. John Locke, influential on the founders, viewed "the people" as those forming a "body politic" through consent (Second Treatise of Government, 1689). Blackstone's Commentaries (1765) limited arms to "subjects," a concept the framers adapted to "citizens." Thapar cites the English Bill of Rights (1689), restricting arms to loyal Protestant subjects, excluding aliens.

Historical Traditions

Founding-era evidence shows rights were citizen-exclusive. Colonial charters and state constitutions used "the people" or "citizens" for arms-bearing, assembly, and petition rights. Pennsylvania's 1776 Constitution limited arms to "freemen," meaning citizens. Thapar highlights that aliens lacked these privileges, as Blackstone confined them to basic protections under the law of nations.

The Alien Act of 1798 allowed deporting "dangerous" aliens without due process, implying no constitutional rights attachment. Madison and Jefferson debated this, but the Act's passage underscores aliens' outsider status. Thapar argues history disarms non-allegiant groups like Loyalists, analogous to unlawful immigrants today.

Supreme Court precedent supports this. In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez (1990), the Court suggested "the people" means those with "sufficient connection" via citizenship or allegiance, excluding casual entrants. Thapar critiques extensions to noncitizens as ahistorical, noting even First Amendment speech rights are limited for aliens (Reno v. AADC, 1999).

Applying to Broader Rights

This citizen-centric premise extends beyond the Second Amendment. Voting and office-holding explicitly require citizenship (U.S. Const. art. I, Sections 2-3; art. II, Section 1). Due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments uses "person," but political rights like assembly and petition are for "the people," historically citizen-limited. Thapar notes the First Amendment's petition right as an "attribute of national citizenship" (United States v. Cruikshank, 1875).

Fourth Amendment searches apply tentatively to noncitizens (INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 1984), but Thapar argues its roots in English subjects' rights exclude unlawful aliens. Extending rights universally undermines sovereignty, as noncitizens lack consent incentives to obey laws.

Implications and Absurdity of Alternatives

Thapar warns that including unlawful immigrants in "the people" creates absurdities, like arming potential threats without allegiance. History shows the Constitution as a citizen-governance compact; applying it to noncitizens dilutes this. As Chief Justice Jay stated in Chisholm v. Georgia (1793), sovereignty "devolved on the people" as citizens.

This ruling highlights ongoing debates, but Thapar's history-driven dissent affirms: Constitutional rights are for citizens, preserving the founders' vision of self-rule.

Michael J Badagliacco, “MJB”

Michael is a father of five, grandfather of three, United States Air Force veteran, international recording artist, and Editor-in-Chief of the Colorado DOGE Report. He is passionate about the United States of America and the founders’ genius in crafting the Constitution.